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Abstract
Comparing monopoly bundling with separate sales is relatively straightforward in an envi-
ronment with a large number of goods. In this paper we show that results that are similar to
the asymptotic results can be obtained in the more realistic case with a given ￿nite number of
goods provided that the distributions of valuations are symmetric and log-concave.
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of celery and a bunch of broccoli....I don￿ t like broccoli. (US Senator John McCain in
an interview on Cable TV rates published in the Washington Post, March 24, 2004).
1 Introduction
Bundling, the practice of selling two or more products as a package deal, is a common phenom-
enon in markets where sellers have market power. It is sometimes possible to rationalize bundling
by complementarities in technologies or in preferences. However, it has long been understood that
bundling may be a pro￿table device for price discrimination, even when the willingness to pay for
one good is una⁄ected by whether other goods in the bundle are consumed or not, and when no
costs are saved through bundling (Adams and Yellen [1]).
In the earliest literature, bundling was typically seen as a way to exploit negative correlation
between valuations for di⁄erent goods (see Adams and Yellen [1] and Schmalansee [21]). Since then,
it has been shown that bundling is useful also when valuations for di⁄erent goods are stochastically
independent. In particular, McAfee et al [14] show that mixed bundling, which refers to a selling
strategy where each good can be purchased either as a separate good or as part of a bundle, leads to
a strict increase in pro￿ts relative to the case where goods are only o⁄ered separately, provided that
a condition on the joint distribution of valuations is satis￿ed. The distributional condition holds
generically, and is implied by stochastic independence, so the logic has nothing do with exploiting
correlations. An obvious downside with the generality of this result is that the analysis is silent on
which goods should be bundled. All goods should be bundled in one way or the other!
In this paper, we show that if mixed bundling is ruled out (by assumption), then we ob-
tain a rather intuitive characterization for when the monopolist should bundle and when separate
sales is a better idea. To some extent this characterization con￿rms (mainly) numerical results in
Schmalansee [22], namely, the higher the marginal cost and the lower is the mean valuation, the
less likely that bundling dominates separate sales.
When limiting our comparison to pure bundling versus separate provision we are able to high-
light a clear intuition for what happens when two or more goods are sold as a bundle. The key
e⁄ect driving all the results is that the variance in the relevant willingness to pay is reduced when
goods are bundled. In our paper we provide a partial characterization for when this reduction in
variance is bene￿cial for the monopolist, and when it is not.
1The crucial idea is that bundling makes the tails of the distribution of willingness to pay thinner.
However, what we need is a rather strong notion of what ￿thinner tails￿means. Speci￿cally, we need
to be able to conclude that for a given per-good price below (above) the mean, bundling increases
(reduces) the probability of trade. This can be rephrased as saying that the average valuation is
more peaked than the underlying distributions. Notice that the law of large numbers can be used
to make this conclusion if there are su¢ ciently many goods available, but, for a given ￿nite number
of goods, counterexamples are easy to construct. We therefore need to make some distributional
assumptions, and, assuming that valuations are distributed in accordance to symmetric and log-
concave densities, we can use a result from Proschan [19] to unambiguously rank distributions in
terms of relative peakedness.1
Bundling therefore reduces the e⁄ective dispersion in the buyers￿tastes under our distributional
assumptions. Sometimes, that is when a good should be sold with high probability (either because
costs are low or because valuations tend to be high) this is to the advantage for the monopolist. At
other times, that is for goods with a thin market, the monopolist is better o⁄ relying on the right
tail of the distribution and bundling is a bad idea.
The idea that ￿bundling reduces dispersion￿has been around for a long time, and there is even
some emerging empirical evidence supporting this as a motivation to bundle (see Crawford [7]).
What is largely missing in the literature however are results at a reasonable level of generality
that establishes conditions for when bundling can be explained in this way. Schmalansee [22]
considers the case with normally distributed distributions of valuations (which belongs to the class
we consider), and, relying mainly on numerical methods, he reaches a similar conclusion. Recently,
Ibragimov [12] has developed a related characterization relying on a generalization of the result in
Proschan [19].
In the context of ￿information goods￿(goods with zero marginal costs) Bakos and Brynjolfsson
[5] used a similar idea to argue that bundling is better than separate sales. More recently, Geng et
al [10] shows that even the case with zero marginal costs can yield surprising results. While both
Bakos and Brynjolfsson [5] and Geng et al [10] assume zero marginal costs, the main di⁄erence
with our paper is that they focus on results for large numbers of goods. We also prove some
asymptotic results, but our preference structure is much simpler, and the results are accordingly
straightforward. Instead, our contribution is that we can get results for the case with a given ￿nite
number of goods that are similar in spirit to the large numbers analysis.
1Recently, Ibragimov [11] has generalized the result in Proschan [19].
22 The Model
The underlying economic environment is the same as in McAfee et al [14], except that we allow
for more than two goods. A pro￿t maximizing monopolist sells K indivisible products indexed
by j = 1;:::;K, and good j is produced at a constant unit cost cj: A representative consumer is
interested in buying at most one unit of each good and is characterized by a vector of valuations
￿ = (￿1;:::;￿K); where ￿j is interpreted as the consumers￿valuation of good j: The vector ￿ is




where p is the transfer from the consumer to the seller and Ij is a dummy taking on value 1 if good
j is consumed and 0 otherwise. Valuations are assumed stochastically independent and we let Fj
denote the marginal distribution of ￿j: Hence, ￿K
j=iFj (￿j) is the cumulative distribution of ￿:
3 Peakedness of Convolutions of Log-concave Densities
A rough interpretation of the law of large numbers is that the distribution of the average of
a random sample gets more and more concentrated around the population mean as the sample
size grows. However, the law of large numbers does not imply that the probability of a given
size deviation from the mean is monotonically decreasing in the sample size. In general, no such
monotone convergence can be guaranteed.
To discuss such monotonicity a notion of ￿relative peakedness￿of two distributions is needed.
We use a de￿nition from Birnbaum [6]:
De￿nition 1 Let x1 and x2 be real random variables. Then x1 is said to be more peaked than x2
if
Pr[jx1 ￿ E(x1)j ￿ t] ￿ Pr[jx2 ￿ E(x2)j ￿ t]
for all t ￿ 0: If the inequality is strict for all t > 0 we say that x1 is strictly more peaked than x2:2
A random variable is said to be log-concave if the logarithm of the probability density function
is concave. This is a rather broad set of distributions, that includes the uniform, normal, logistic,
2Strictly speaking, Birnbaum [6] uses a local de￿nition of peakedness where the expectations are replaced with
arbitrary points in the support. For our purposes, only ￿peakedness around the mean￿ is relevant, so we follow
Proschan [19] and drop the quali￿ers.
3extreme value, exponential, Laplace, Weibull, and many other common parametric densities (see
Bagnoli and Bergstrom [4] for further examples). Comparative peakedness of convex combinations
of log-concave random variables are studied in Proschan [19], and we will apply one of his results
in this paper. To avoid discussing majorization theory we will use his key lemma directly rather
than his main result.
Theorem 1 (Lemma 2.2 in Proschan [19]) Let f be a symmetric log-concave density. Suppose
that x1;::::;xm are independently distributed with density f; ￿x (w3;::::;wm) ￿ 0 with
Pm


















A corollary of this result is that 1
m
Pm
i=1 xi is strictly increasing in peakedness in m; that is, the
probability of a given size deviation from the population average is indeed monotonically decreasing
in sample size for the class of symmetric log-concave distributions.3 It is rather easy to construct
discrete examples to verify that unimodality (which is implied by log-concavity) is necessary for
Theorem 1. However, unimodality is not su¢ cient. An example that clari￿es the role of log-
concavity is considered in Section 5.1. The role of the symmetry assumption is simply to avoid the
location of the peak to depend on the weights.
4 To Bundle or Not to Bundle Many Goods
Since Theorem 1 may be viewed as a result establishing monotone convergence to a law of large
numbers it is useful to ￿rst consider the implications of bundling a large number of goods. This
analysis is not particularly innovative, and is only meant to establish a benchmark to compare the
results in Section 5 with. The basic ideas are similar to Armstrong [3] and Bakos and Brynjolfsson
[4], and a careful analysis of a more general speci￿cation of consumer preferences (that allows the
valuation for the good to decline in the number of goods consumed) can be found in Geng et al [10].
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j=1 be a sequence of goods, where each good j can be produced at a constant marginal
cost cj: The distribution over ￿j; the valuation for good j, is denoted by Fj: In the absence of the
bundling instrument, the maximized pro￿t from sales of good j is thus given by
￿j = max
pj
(pj ￿ cj)(1 ￿ Fj (pj)): (1)
Assume instead that the monopolist has monopoly rights to the ￿rst K goods in the sequence
and sells them as a bundle. That is, the monopolist posts a single price p and the consumer must
choose between purchasing all the goods at price p or none at all. Assuming that there is a uniform
upper bound ￿2 such that Var￿j ￿ ￿2 for every j; we know that, for each " > 0 there exists




















5 ￿ 1 ￿ "; (2)
for any K > K ("): Obviously, (2) implies that;
1. Pr
hPK
j=1 ￿j ￿ p
i
￿ 1 ￿ " if p ￿
PK
j=1 E￿j ￿ "K
2. Pr
hPK
j=1 ￿j ￿ p
i
￿ " if p ￿
PK
j=1 E￿j + "K
In other words, charging a price which on a per good basis is just slightly below the average
expected valuation ensures that the bundle will be sold almost surely. On the other hand, a price
that exceeds which exceeds the average expected valuation ever so slightly implies that almost all
types will decide not to buy. This observation can be used to provide a simple su¢ cient condition
for when separate sales dominates bundling in the case of many goods:
Proposition 1 Suppose that there exists ￿2 such that Var￿j ￿ ￿2 for every j and ￿ > 0 such that




j=1 cj for every
K: Then, selling all goods separately is better than selling all goods as a single bundle whenever
K > ￿2=￿2:4
The condition says that if the pro￿t from separate sales is non-negligible for every good and if
costs exceeds the sum of the expected valuations, then the monopolist is better o⁄selling the goods
separately. The idea is that, if goods are bundled, the monopolist must charge a price above the
4Instead of viewing the proposition as a comparisson between separate sales and bundling all goods, one may also
interpret the result as saying that ￿
2=￿
2 is an upper bound on the number of goods in each bundle.
5sum of the costs in order to make a pro￿t. But, if many goods are bundled, such price inevitably
leads to negligible sales.
Except for the rather innocuous restriction that ￿j ￿ ￿ for each j; Proposition 1 is expressed





j=1 cj: The reason is that, while the pro￿ts under bundling can be
bound tightly from above and below, the pro￿ts from separate sales depend crucially on the shape
of the distribution of valuations. Any reasonably general condition for when bundling dominates
asymptotically therefore must be expressed in the (endogenous) non-bundling pro￿ts.
Proposition 2 Suppose that there exists ￿;￿2 such that E￿j ￿ ￿ and Var￿j ￿ ￿2 for every j:5










cj ￿ ￿K (3)
for every j (where ￿j is de￿ned in (1)). Then, there exists K￿ such that selling all goods as a
single bundle is better than separate sales for every K ￿ K￿.





j cj; but a proof is in the appendix for completeness. For comparison with the
results in Section 5.2 it may be observed that a su¢ cient (but not necessary) condition for (3) is
that if p￿
j solves (1), then p￿
j < E￿j for every j: It is also useful for the discussion below to observe
that if we make the further regularity assumptions that E￿j and Var￿j are bounded away from
zero, then (3) is automatically satis￿ed if cj = 0 for every j:
4.1 The Ine¢ ciency of Bundling
The reader should note that all we have done is to compare the pro￿ts of two possible selling
strategies. Except for in very special circumstances, both separate sales and full bundling are
economically ine¢ cient. The ine¢ ciency of bundling should be obvious: consumers will purchase
5The uniform bound on the expected valuation is needed to rule out examples of the following nature: assume
that ￿j is unformly distributed on [j ￿ 1;j + 1] and cj = 0 for each j: Condition (3) is satis￿ed for every K since the
monopoly price is pj = j ￿ 1 for each j ￿ 3: However, the pro￿t per good explodes as K tends to in￿nity implying
that even a negligible probability of the consumer rejecting the bundle could be more important than the increase in
pro￿t conditional on selling the bundle.
6goods for which their valuation is below the unit cost of production in order to be able to consume
other goods that they value highly.
In the case with many goods, Armstrong [3] has shown that a two-part tari⁄ can be used to
obtain an approximately e¢ cient allocation, where the monopolist almost fully extracts the surplus.
This mechanism sets a tari⁄ T for the right to purchase any good the monopolist sells at marginal
cost. With T=K set a little bit below the average consumer surplus (where the average is taken
over the K goods), almost all types are willing to pay the tari⁄ T: In general, this mechanism
dominates the pure bundling mechanism both in terms of the pro￿t for the monopolist and the
social surplus generated. The one exception is when all the unit costs are zero-in which case the
two mechanisms coincide. While this observation is trivial it does suggest that the place to search
for an e¢ ciency enhancing role of bundling is in the context of non-rival goods, or, more generally,
in natural monopoly situations.6
5 To Bundle or Not to Bundle in the Finite Case
5.1 Example
To demonstrate how small numbers in general can overturn the intuition from the asymptotic
results we consider an example with two goods, j = 1;2; each produced at zero marginal cost.
Assume that the valuation for each good j is distributed in accordance with cumulative density F






2￿j for ￿j < 1
(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿
2￿j ￿j ￿ 1
(4)
This cumulative distribution is most easily thought of as the result of drawing ￿j from a uniform
[0;2] distribution with probability ￿ and setting ￿j = 1 with probability 1 ￿ ￿: In the case of
separate sales we ￿rst note that if ￿ = 1; then the optimal price is to set p = 1: But, for ￿ < 1;
p = 1 continues to be the optimal price, since mass is moved to valuation 1 without changing the
distribution of ￿j conditional on ￿j 6= 1: Hence, the maximized pro￿t in the case of separate sales
is given by
￿1 = ￿2 =
￿
2




6To make this problem interesting, there has to be a non-trivial decision as to whether a good should be produced
or not. See Fang and Norman [9] for an analysis.
7Next, consider the case with the two goods being bundled. The optimal price for the bundle is
then the solution to
max








where the point of the change in variable is that the question as to whether separate sales or
bundling is better is transformed into a comparative statics exercise with respect to the cumulative
distribution of valuations.
Denote by FA for the cumulative density of the average valuation ￿1+￿2
2 : Clearly, FA has mean
1 and a smaller variance than F; but, which is the crucial feature of the example, FA is not
unambiguously more peaked than F: This follows immediately from the fact that the probability
that ￿1+￿2
2 is exactly equal to one is (1 ￿ ￿)
2 ; whereas the probability that ￿j is exactly equal to 1





￿ 1 ￿ ￿t
￿
= FA (1 ￿ t) > F (1 ￿ t) = Pr[￿j ￿ 1 ￿ ￿t]
for t 2 [0;t￿]: Hence, FA and F cannot be compared in terms of relative peakedness. For the
comparison between bundling and separate sales, the implication of this is that the construction
that worked in the asymptotic case ￿pricing the bundle just below the expected value ￿will reduce
rather than increase sales. However, this doesn￿ t prove that bundling is worse since (i) a price
slightly above the expectation leads to higher sales than when goods are sold separately, (ii) a
su¢ ciently large reduction in price relative from the expected value also leads to higher sales than
when goods are sold separately.
Let pB denote the pro￿t maximizing price for the bundled good and let ￿B be the associated
pro￿t. There are three possibilities:














Hence, the probability of selling the bundle is
(1 ￿ ￿)
2 +






+ (1 ￿ ￿)
The pro￿t is thus given by ￿B = 2￿￿￿￿(1 ￿ ￿) < 2￿￿ = ￿1+￿2: Hence, if this is the best
price for the bundled good the monopolist is strictly better o⁄ selling the goods separately.
Case 2: pB < 2: If ￿ is close to 1, then this will indeed lead to an increase in pro￿ts. However, if ￿
is su¢ ciently small, any price strictly below 2 will generate lower pro￿ts than the maximized
8pro￿ts under separate sales. This is shown formally in Appendix B. The idea is that to be
able to make a larger pro￿t than ￿1 +￿2 = 2￿￿ it is necessary to sell at a price pB > 2￿￿:









: But this implies that any price for the bundled good on the interval
(2 ￿ ￿;2) is worse than selling the goods separately at price 2￿￿
2 each.
Case 3: pB > 2: Finally, we need to consider pB > 2: However, as ￿ ! 0 the probability of selling
the bundle at such a price goes to zero, so for ￿ su¢ ciently small this can be ruled out as
well.
Summing up, we have an example (when ￿ is small) where if the monopolist had access to a large
number of goods with valuations being independently and identically distributed in accordance to
the distribution (4) it would be possible to almost fully extract the surplus from the consumer by
selling all goods as a single bundle. Nevertheless, with only two goods, separate sales does better
than bundling.
Easier examples can be constructed, but (4) has been chosen for a reason. Standard continuity
arguments can be used to extend the example the case where ￿j is distributed uniformly on [0;2]
with probability ￿ and distributed with, say, a normal distribution with mean 1 and variance ￿2
with probability 1 ￿ ￿: If ￿2 and ￿ are both su¢ ciently small, separate sales dominates bundling.
Notice that this is despite the fact that the distribution is symmetric, unimodal, smooth, and
generated as a mixture of two (di⁄erent) logconcave densities with identical means. However,
mixtures of logconcave densities are not necessarily logconcave (see Section 3.4 in An [2]).
5.2 Bundling with Symmetric Log-Concave Densities
We now assume that each ￿j is independently and identically distributed according to a sym-
metric log-concave probability density f with expectation e ￿ > 0: Any form of mixed bundling is
ruled out by assumption. The problem for the monopolist can therefore be separated in two parts;
1. Decide how to package the goods into di⁄erent bundles, which, with mixed bundling ruled out,
is the same as partitioning the set of goods produced by the monopolist in what we refer to as a
bundling menu. Following Palfrey [17], we denote such a bundling menu by B = fB1;:::;BMg;
where each Bi 2 B is a subset of f1;:::;mg and where Bi\Bi0 = ? for each i 6= i0; and M is the
number of bundles sold by the monopolist. The menu B = ff1g;f2g;::::;fKgg corresponds
9with separate sales and B = ff1;::::;Kgg describes the other extreme case where all goods
are sold as a single bundle.
2. For each bundle, construct the optimal pricing rule. This is a single dimensional problem






must be treated symmetrically). By standard results (see Myerson [15], Riley and Zeckhauser
[20]) there is therefore no further loss of generality in restricting the monopolist to ￿xed price
mechanisms for each bundle.
We are now in a position to prove an analogue of Proposition 1 that is valid also in the ￿nite
case.
Proposition 3 Suppose that each ￿j is independently and identically distributed according to a




and has expectation e ￿:
Assume that each good j is produced at unit cost cj, where cj < ￿: Let B￿ be the optimal bundling









j2Bi cj: Let ni denote the number of goods in bundle Bi; and let fi and Fi denote the probability










































j2Bi cj; since any price less than or equal to
P
j2Bi cj gives a weakly negative




gives a strictly positive pro￿t. Instead,






































































10showing that unbundling the goods in Bi increases the pro￿t for the monopolist.
While the assumptions obviously are much more restrictive, Proposition 3 provides a close
analogue to Proposition 1. It may be noted that the ￿non-triviality assumption￿cj < ￿ is analogous
to the condition that ￿i > ￿ in Proposition 1, so that the only di⁄erence between the results is
whether separate sales is compared with a large bundle or a bundle of any ￿nite size.
The link between the large numbers analysis and the ￿nite case is somewhat weaker in the case
with unit costs below the expected value. The result is:
Proposition 4 Suppose that each ￿j is independently and identically distributed according to a




and has expectation e ￿:
Furthermore, assume that the unit cost is given by cj = c < ~ ￿ for each good j. Let the (unique) pro￿t
maximizing price in the case of separate sales be given by p￿ and the (unique) pro￿t maximizing
price when all goods are sold as a single bundle be p￿
B: Then;
1. If p￿ ￿ e ￿; all goods should be sold as a single bundle.7
2. If p￿
B ￿ Ke ￿; all goods should be sold separately.
While phrased in terms of endogenous prices, the comparative statics properties of monopoly
pricing are rather straightforward. The monopoly price is increasing in the unit cost of production.
Shifting the distribution of ￿j to the right or replacing F with a (log-concave symmetric distribution)
G with the same mode that is strictly less peaked than F also leads to an increase in the monopoly
price. Taken together, Propositions 3 and 4 therefore have some rather natural implications as to
which type of goods we should expect to see bundled.
The reader may notice that Proposition 4 only considers the case where the unit costs are
identical. The reason for this is simply that a disadvantage with bundling is lost ￿ exibility in terms
of adjusting the pricing to the unit costs of production when they vary across goods. That is,
bundling two goods with di⁄erent unit costs has negative consequences for productive e¢ ciency.
This is true also in the asymptotic analysis, but there the monopolist can extract almost the full
surplus leading to the relatively clean condition (3), which applies even when costs are di⁄erent for
di⁄erent goods. In the ￿nite case, bundling does increase revenue when the average price is to the
left of the mode of the distribution, but, if costs are di⁄erent, the change in pro￿t depends on a
non-trivial trade-o⁄ between the increase in revenue and the loss in productive e¢ ciency.
7A su¢ cient condition for p
￿ ￿ ~ ￿ is that f(e ￿) >
1
2(e ￿￿c) (see Fang and Norman [8]).
11Also note that the example in Section 5.1 demonstrates that log-concavity cannot be dropped
from the statement of the result of Proposition 4; the example satis￿es all conditions in the state-
ment except log-concavity.8
Finally, it is worthwhile to point out that, even for the case with all goods being sold at the
same unit cost, the characterization in Proposition 4 is incomplete. It is quite possible that p￿ > e ￿
and p￿
B < Ke ￿; in which case Proposition 4 is silent on whether bundling or separate sales maximizes
the monopolist￿ s pro￿ts. We return to this case in Section 5.2.2.
5.2.1 The Proof of Proposition 4
The essence of the proof is that bundling at a constant per-good price leads to higher sales if
and only if the per-good price is below the mode of the distribution.
Proof. (Part 1) Suppose for contradiction that there are least two bundles in the monopolist optimal
bundling menu and label these B1 and B2: Let n1 and n2 denote the number of goods in B1 and





i = 1;2: Log-concavity is preserved under convolutions (Karlin [13]), implying that f1 and f2 are






















is single-peaked in pk for k = 1;2:9 Let p￿




ni ￿ e ￿:
To see this, ￿rst note that if Bi contains a single good, the claim is immediate. For Bi containing
more than a single good, note that, due to single-peakedness of the pro￿t function,
p￿
i
ni > e ￿ implies
8Logconcavity of the valuation distribution is a su¢ cient condition to rule out ￿too abrupt￿changes in the density
which was the culprit for the results in the example in Section 5.1.








and decreasing when the inequality is reversed. Since log-concavity implies that p +
1￿F(p)
f(p) is strictly increasing, we

















































































: However, Theorem 1 implies that ￿i is strictly










Now, consider a deviation where the monopolist sells all the goods in B1 and B2 as a single


















2 with probability n2
n1+n2
(9)
Denote by F1+2 the cumulative of ￿1+2 =
P
j2B1[B2 ￿j



















































































































Hence, the bundle B1+2 generates a higher pro￿t than the sum of the pro￿ts from B1 and B2:






n2 = e ￿: In this case the pro￿t from selling B1+2 at price
13p￿
1 + p￿
2 = (n1 + n2)e ￿ is the same as B1 and B2 as separate bundles: However, for p￿
i = nie ￿ to be





















































since f1+2 is strictly more peaked than f1 and f2: Hence, a small decrease in the price leads to a
pro￿t from selling B1+2 that is strictly higher than the pro￿ts from selling B1 and B2 as separate
bundles.
(Part 2) Sketch. The argument is the same as for Part 1, but in reverse. Using the same
style of reasoning as in Claim 1 one establishes that any bundle Bi has to sell at price p￿
i ￿ nie ￿
if p￿
B ￿ Ke ￿: Once this is established, the strict ordering in terms of relative peakedness is used
to show that breaking up any bundle and selling the goods separately leads to a strict increase in
pro￿ts if p￿
i > nie ￿: For the case with p￿
i = nie ￿ one shows that, if the goods are sold separately, the
pro￿t function must be strictly increasing in p at e ￿:
5.2.2 The Case with p￿ > e ￿ and p￿
B < Ke ￿
As we have already observed, there is a hole in the characterization in Proposition 4. We end
this Section by observing that, while we don￿ t know whether separate sales or full bundling is
better, at least we can show that the optimal bundling strategy must be one of these two.
Proposition 5 Suppose that each ￿j is independently and identically distributed according to a




and has expectation e ￿:
Furthermore, assume that the unit cost is given by cj = c for each good j. Then, either full bundling
or separate sales is optimal.
Proof. Suppose not. Let the optimal bundling menu be given by B = fB1;:::;BMg; where 2 ￿ M ￿
K ￿ 1: Without loss of generality assume that n1 ￿ 2 and n1 ￿ n2 ￿ :::: ￿ nM. We then observe
that for B1 to be part of the optimal bundling menu, it is necessary that p￿
1 ￿ n1e ￿. Otherwise,
by the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 3, the monopolist would increase sales and
14therefore pro￿ts by selling the goods in B1 separately at price
p￿
1
n1 each. Moreover, let i￿ ￿ 1 be the
highest index such that ni￿ ￿ 2: For the same reason as for bundle B1; p￿
i ￿ nie ￿ for every i ￿ i￿: We
can therefore apply the same argument as in Proposition 4 to argue that creating a single bundle
of bundles B1;:::;Bi￿ increases the pro￿t for the monopolist. Hence the only remaining possibility
is that there is one non-trivial bundle, which we will label B￿
1; and that the rest of the goods are
sold separately.
Assume without loss that B￿
1 = f1;::;kg and that goods k +1;::;K are sold separately. Let ￿￿
1
denote the pro￿t from sales of the bundle B￿
1 and p￿
1 be the pro￿t maximizing monopoly price for
bundle B￿
1: Arguments above imply that p￿
1 ￿ k~ ￿: Let ￿ denote the maximized pro￿t when a good
is sold separately. Finally, let ￿B denote the maximized pro￿t if all goods are bundled. Optimality
of the bundling menu implies that
￿￿
1 + (K ￿ k)￿ ￿ ￿B (11)
￿￿
1 + (K ￿ k)￿ ￿ K￿









Hence, if the ￿rst inequality in (11) holds, then
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where FA is the CDF of
PK





















From Theorem 1 FA is strictly more single peaked than F1; the CDF of
Pk
j=1 ￿j=k; and since p
￿




































15which contradicts the second inequality in (11). Symmetrically, if the second inequality in (11) is















violating the ￿rst inequality in (11).
6 Discussion
Many papers on bundling, in particular in the more recent literature, take a ￿purist￿mechanism
design approach to the problem. These papers allow a monopolist to design selling mechanisms,
which consist of a mapping from vectors of valuations to probabilities to consume each of the goods
and a transfer rule. The problem is then to ￿nd the optimal mechanism for the monopolist, subject
to incentive and participation constraints. While this in principle is a more satisfactory setup for
studying the pros and cons of bundling than the approach in our paper, the obvious downside is
that the problem is generally rather intractable. Hence, except for a few qualitative features, we
know very little about the solution to this problem.
Other papers in the literature, notably McA⁄e et al [14], study a simpler problem, where the
monopolist is restricted to simple pricing policies. While more restrictive than a full mechanism
design approach, this is still less restrictive than our set of available instruments. Any given good
can be sold both as part of a bundle and as a separate good, a practice that is referred to a mixed
bundling in the literature. This obviously makes lots of sense: in many markets it is possible to buy
access to cable TV at one price, high speed internet access at one price, and a bundle consisting of
both cable TV and high speed internet access at a price that is lower than the sum of the price of
the components. Hence, we do observe mixed bundling in the real world.
The main result in McA⁄e et al [14] is that, generically, the monopolist should always o⁄er
a non-trivial mixed bundling scheme. While obviously a powerful result, this has the arguably
unpleasant implication that any monopolist selling more than a single good should o⁄er to sell all
their goods as part of a bundle. Put, di⁄erently, the result does not tell us about which kind of
goods we should expect to see bundled. Moreover, the rather crude real world bundling schemes
that we observe are rather puzzling in the light of McA⁄e et al [14]: the question as to why ESPN
is available as a component of a bundle when championship boxing games tend to be available only
on a pay-per-view basis cannot be answered.
16Our approach, which is to assume that any good can only be part of a single bundle, is obviously
ad hoc, but it gives us a reasonable hypothesis about the di⁄erence between ESPN and Champi-
onship boxing games. ESPN programming is presumably cheaper for the local cable provider,
implying that it is more likely that it is a good where bundling leads to higher pro￿ts.
We do not pretend to have any general justi￿cation for ruling out mixed bundling. However, in
some cases one can imagine technological reasons; there may simply be some ￿xed costs involved in
the creation of a bundle. For example, in the context of bundling computer programs it doesn￿ t seem
farfetched to assume that selling components separately would require some extra programming
work to guarantee compatibility of the components with older software that could be avoided if the
new programs are bundled.
Another justi￿cation is that anti-trust law is explicitly expressed in terms of ￿anti-competitive
mixed bundling￿ . While the legal interpretation of ￿mixed￿ is unclear it does seem somewhat
reasonable that there may be instances where it is easier to get away with pure bundling than
with mixed bundling.1112 In fact, in a recent case in the UK, the legal interpretation of mixed
bundling seems to coincide with the terminology used in the Economics literature. The decision by
the O¢ ce of Fair Trading [18] in the UK on alleged anti-competitive mixed bundling by the British
Sky Broadcasting Limited explicitly states that: mixed bundling refers to a situation where two or
more products are o⁄ered together at a price less than the sum of the individual product prices- i.e.
there are discounts for the purchase of additional products. This test, which compares marginal
prices, requires that a product can be bought both as a bundle and as a separate good, therefore
has no bite at all when bundling is of the form considered in this paper.
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A Appendix A: Proofs of Results in Section 4.
Proof of Proposition 1.




j=1 cj we can therefore formulate the monopolists maximization problem as



















































































j=1 E￿j + "K ￿
PK



































comes from observing that a probability is always less than one (if
" is su¢ ciently small the bound from Chebyshev￿ s inequality is useless). We observe that ￿2
K"2 ￿ 1



































￿K < 0 for every K > ￿2
￿2 :
Proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. Suppose the monopolist charges a price p =
PK
j=1 E￿j ￿ ￿K





























































; whereas the pro￿t from separate




j=1 cj ￿ ￿K: Hence, the di⁄erence between the















































Under the assumption that there exists ￿ such that
PK
j=1 E￿j < ￿ for every j the expression above
is positive for K large enough.
B Appendix B: Calculations For Example 5.1
We want to show that if the monopolist sets a price pB < 2; then, if ￿ is su¢ ciently small, the
pro￿t is lower than the maximized pro￿t under separate sales, ￿1 + ￿2 = 2 ￿ ￿: We begin with a
simple observation:
Claim B1 pB > 2 ￿ ￿ for the pro￿t under bundling to exceed 2 ￿ ￿:
This is obvious, since pB would be the pro￿t if the consumer would buy for sure.
Next, observe that for p < 1 we have that




























By Claim B1, we can restrict our attention to values of pB 2 (2 ￿ ￿;2); which is equivalent














: For any 1
2 < p < 1; the monopolist￿ s pro￿t from selling bundle at a bundle-price of 2p
receives pro￿t:
2p[1 ￿ FA (p)] = 2p
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)












21On the other hand, the monopolist￿ s pro￿t from selling the two goods at price p for each receives
pro￿t




























= (1 ￿ ￿)
2 + 2￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿2 ￿
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)


























Note that 2p￿(p) measures the di⁄erence in the monopolist￿ s pro￿t between selling each good
separately at a price of p for each good and selling the bundle at a price of 2p. Thus if ￿(p) is
positive, then the monopolist increases its pro￿t by selling the goods separately at half the price of
the bundled good; and if ￿(p) is negative, then the pro￿t under bundling is higher.
































(1 ￿ ￿) > 0:
Hence;





We know from Claim B1 that we only need to consider pB > 2 ￿ ￿; which corresponds to an
average price p > 1 ￿ ￿
2: Evaluating ￿(p) at p = 1 ￿ ￿
























































































































> 0 for ￿ su¢ ciently small.
To sum up:
1. Claim B1 shows that bundling at pB < 2 ￿ ￿ is dominated by separate sales
2. Claim B3 shows that bundling at pB = 2 ￿ ￿ leads to lower sales than separate sales if ￿ is
small enough.
3. Claim B2 shows that bundling at any price on the interval (2 ￿ ￿;2) also leads to lower sales
than separate sales, provided that ￿ is small enough.
Together, this implies that for ￿ is su¢ ciently small, there exists no price pB < 2 for the
bundled good that gives a higher payo⁄ than ￿1 + ￿2.
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